P. SUDHOLTER Maschler and Peleg (1966) , and is reasonable in the sense of Milnor (1952) . In view of these facts the modified nucleolus reflects structure of the game. In the next section it turns out that this solution concept completely reveals the structure of each game in the remarkable class of weighted majority games with a fixed number of winning coalitions.
In ?3 the behavior of the modified nucleolus in the weighted majority case is discussed. It turns out in Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 that T(v) induces a representation of v, if and only if v is representable. Moreover, the unique element of T(v) coincides with the normalized vector of weights of the unique minimal integer representation in the homogeneous case. Peleg (1968) showed the same results for weighted majority constant-sum games and the nucleolus. In view of the coincidence of the pre-and modified nucleolus in the constant-sum case (Corollary 2.4) and the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the nucleolus in the weighted majority constant-sum case, this result of the present paper is a generalization of Peleg's. Moreover, the modified nucleolus generalizes the concept of the minimal integer representation in the homogeneous case. Hence this solution can be seen as a canonical representation in the general weighted majority case.
Coincidence of the solution concepts on constant-sum games together with a "modified" constant-sum extension property are the basic properties of a characterization of T on the class of weighted majority games. The dual constant-sum extension of a game u has two additional players and assigns the worth of each coalition w.r.t. v and v* respectively to the coalition together with the first and second additional player respectively, the worth of the grand coalition to each coalition containing both additional players, and zero to each other coalition. Consequently, the dual constant-sum extensions of a game and its dual coincide up to renaming the additional players. The modified nucleolus satisfies the dual constantsum extension property in the weighted majority case, i.e. the modified nucleoli of the game and of the dual constant-sum extension arise from each other in a canonical way (see Theorem 3.5). In Proposition 3.8 it turns out that the modified nucleolus on the set of weighted majority games with player set contained in an infinite universe is uniquely characterized by Pareto optimality, coincidence with the nucleolus on constant-sum games, and the dual constant-sum extension property. Moreover, all axioms including the infinity assumption on the universe of players turn out to be logically independent. Compared to the (pre)nucleolus which lexicographically minimizes the "dissatisfaction vector" of the coalitions, where the dissatisfaction of a coalition w.r.t. some (pre)imputation x is its excess at x, the modified nucleolus lexicographically minimizes the "envy vector" of pairs of coalitions, where coalition S envies coalition T at the preimputation x by a if the excess difference of S and T at x coincides with a. Note that the modified least core of the game is a compact convex subset of the set of preimputations, since the same is true for the least core and, thus, for the symmetric least core of the dual cover (i.e. the set given in (ii) of Lemma 1.7).
Notation and definitions. A cooperative game with transferable utility-a game -is a pair G = (N,
v
Using (7) equality (6) directly implies (5). Now the proof can be completed. Take any S c N with w(S) * u(S), i.e. w(S) = v*(S) * v(S) by (5). Take any T with v(T) ? V* (T). By definition of -and (5) we conclude max{w(T) + w*(S),w(S) + w*(T)} = max{w(T) ? u(S), v*(S) + w*(T)} = max{v(T) + u*(S), v(S) + v*(T)I 0 max{u(T) + v(S),vu*(S) + v*(T)), thus w(T) = v*(T) again by (7). Q.E.D.
2. Properties of the modified solutions. At first Kohlberg's (1971) characterization of the (pre)nucleolus by balanced collections of coalitions is recalled and applied to the modified nucleolus. It should be remarked that his assumption of zero-normalization-i.e. v({i})= 0 for all players i-can be deleted without destroying the proofs. Moreover, the original results were stated for the nucleolus, but it is easy to formulate analogous properties for the prenucleolus (see Peleg (1988 Peleg ( , 1989 (
ii) i is a dummy of v, iff i is a dummy of 5. (iii) min{v(S {i}) -v(S)IS c N\ {i}} < min{5(S U {i}) -v(S)IS c (N \ {i}) u N*}. (iv) max{v(S U {i) -v(S)IS c N\ {i}) > max{v(S u {i}) -5(S)IS c (N\ {i}) u N*}.
PROOF. Observe that v* has the same "desirability structure," the same dummies and so on. To be more precise the exact formulations are as follows-a proof is a straightforward consequence of the definition of v*: i j iff i. ;
i is a dummy of u iff i is one of v* and v((i}) = v*({i}); a = minv(S u {i}) -v(S)IS c N\ {i}} = min{v*(S u {i}) -v*(S)IS c N\ {i}}, b := max{v(S U {i}) -v(S)IS cN\{i}} = max{v*(S u {i}) -v*(S)IS cN\{i}}. ad(i): Let i ] j for some i, j e N and S E N\ {i, j}. Defining S = S U {i}, T = S U {j}, we come up with v(T) + v* (S) r (T u S*) (S u S*) = v(S) + u*(S)
by definition and assumption, thus i vJ. Conversely, if i a vJ and S u T* c (N\ {i, j}) u N*, let w.l.o.g.
b(S u {j} u T*) = v(S u {j}) + v*(T), otherwise exchange the roles of v and v*. Hence 5(S U {j} U T*) < u(S U {i}) + v*(T) < 5(S u {i} U T*). ad(ii):
A proof of this assertion is straightforward using the above observation and therefore we skip it.
THE MODIFIED NUCLEOLUS ad(iii): Take S c N \ {i) and T C N. W.l.o.g. b(S U T*) = v(S) + v*(T)-otherwise exchange v and v*. Then D(S U {i} U T*) -V(S U T*) > v(S U {i}) -u(S) > a.

Finally, assertion (iv) can be proved analogously to (iii). Q.E.D.
This last lemma and the well-known properties of the prenucleolus and the least core together with Proposition 1.4 and Lemma 1.7 directly imply COROLLARY 2.6. Let (N, v) be a game and x e/.f'(v). (1944) and have many interesting applications (see, e.g.,  Shapley 1962 ). According to the structure of simple games it should also be referred to Isbell (1956 Isbell ( ,1958 Isbell ( ,1959 and, in the homogeneous case, to Ostmann (1987a), Rosenmiiller (1982 Rosenmiiller ( , 1984 Rosenmiiller ( , 1987 Up to now this author does not know any "direct" method of generating or enumerating the class of weighted majority games-even recursively w.r.t. the number of players. It is true that only weighted majority constant-sum games have to be generated to obtain the general case (see, e.g., Krohn and Sudholter 1995). Two recursive methods are known in this case, which are indirect in the following sense. They do not yield any recursive formula for the number of games and need comparisons or tests. The first one introduced in Isbell (1959) is strongly based on the comparison of games already constructed. The second one (see Krohn and Sudholter 1995) generates a larger class of constant-sum games-the directed (see Example 2.7 for the corresponding definition) constant-sum games-and extracts those weighted majority games by testing for representability. Isbell suggests that it could be useful to assign a "canonical" unique vector of weights-inducing a representation-to each of these constant-sum games. Peleg (1968) showed that the nucleolus always induces a representation in this case, thus this solution concept yields a canonical vector of weights. Moreover, he concluded that the nucleolus is the normalized vector of weights of the unique minimal representation in the homogeneous case. Besides, it should be remarked that the testing procedure of Krohn and Sudholter (1995) is based on this result. As seen in, e.g., Peleg and Rosenmiiller (1992) and Rosenmiiller and Sudholter (1994) the nucleolus coincides with the prenucleolus for monotone simple constant-sum games. The last paper contains examples which show that the prenucleolus does not necessarily induce a representation if the constant-sum property is dropped.
There are procedures which generate homogeneous constant-sum games (see Isbell 1959 and Sudholter 1988) , but these methods, unfortunately, again require tests. Therefore no formula for the enumeration of this class of games can be deduced from the algorithms. Nevertheless, the larger class of all homogeneous n-person games-up to equivalence-can be generated and enumerated recursively w.r.t. the number of players as shown by Sudholter (1989) . Analogously it could perhaps be possible to generate or enumerate the class of all weighted majority games instead of assuming the constant-sum property. Again, following Isbell and Peleg, it could be useful to have unique weights-which are homogeneous if the game is-even in this case. The first aim of this section is to show that the modified nucleolus satisfies this condition.
In the constant-sum weighted majority case Peleg implicitly showed that each element of the least core and not only the nucleolus induces a representation. Moreover the least core is a singleton if the game is a homogeneous constant-sum 747 game. The analogous assertions in the general weighted majority and homogeneous case respectively are valid. Note that the modified least core satisfies covariance, anonymity, and the dummy property. 
